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Any Proper Cause: The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania Erodes Shareholder Authority in
Favor of Boards of Directors
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship in the realm of nonprofit organizations' is
largely focused on the relationship between these organizations
and the Internal Revenue Code.2 Although achieving and main-
taining tax-exempt status is an important concern, people who are
closely involved in such organizations are also undoubtedly con-
cerned with the day-to-day operations of these entities, and the
rights of the individuals who occupy positions of authority.
On January 12, 2005, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania issued an opinion and order that gives directors of Pennsyl-
vania nonprofit organizations significant power to decide who will
occupy those positions of authority.3 By interpreting a Pennsyl-
vania statute to that effect, the commonwealth court departed
from the traditional understanding of corporate governance, and
its decision could affect the powers of boards of directors in many
for-profit corporations. In the world of business corporations, elec-
tion and removal of directors is typically considered a function of
the shareholders.4 In a nonprofit organization, the members are
equivalent to shareholders, and it is the members who would usu-
ally take action if the organization determined that a director
should be removed.5
1. There is a lack of uniformity as to the proper nomenclature for these groups. "Not-
for-profit" seems more apt than "nonprofit," because it reflects the fact that the organiza-
tion may realize an excess gain over expenditures without actually intending that result.
Nonetheless, "nonprofit" is still commonly used, and it is hoped that the reader under-
stands how much more cumbersome it would be to use "not-for-profit" repeatedly. Fur-
thermore, "organization" leaves open the possibility that a group of people may operate in
this arena without forming a corporation.
2. See, e.g., NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN A. CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIzATIONS
(2003); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1995); BRUCE
R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (8th ed. 2003).
3. Lutz v. Tanglwood Lakes Community Association., Inc., 866 A.2d 471 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005).
4. See, e.g., 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1248 (2005); 43 C.J.S. Industrial Co-
operative Societies § 28 (2005).
5. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.08 (1987).
519
Duquesne Law Review
As nonprofits continue to flourish in communities throughout
the United States, there will continue to be disagreements, some-
times heated, among the people responsible for operating them. It
will become increasingly important, then, that states have clear
and fair statutes governing these operations. At this point, Penn-
sylvania law lacks the clarity that could guide directors of these
organizations through disputes, and the result of the common-
wealth court's decision would not convince a dissenting voice that
Pennsylvania law provides for fair treatment of directors. Fur-
thermore, the case's holding might not be confined to nonprofit
organizations, but might very well extend to for-profit business
corporations. This comment analyzes the background and ration-
ale that informs the current interpretation of Pennsylvania's stat-
ute on removal of a nonprofit's directors, and it will further dis-
cuss the effects that the commonwealth court's decision will have
on the law in the area of corporate governance.
II. THE HISTORY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
AND THEIR DIRECTORS
A. Early Background
Nonprofit organizations exist in the United States due in large
part to the Statute of Charitable Uses, established in England in
1601.6 The activities that are considered "charitable" are now de-
fined, although not exclusively, by federal regulation, and the
term includes "relief of the poor and distressed or of the under-
privileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or
science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments,
or works; lessening of the burdens of Government."7
Homeowners associations, like charitable organizations, are
now exempt from federal income taxes if certain requirements are
met.' As such, these groups are part of what has been termed the
6. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37
DUQ. L. REV. 557, 558 (Summer 1999).
7. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). Although that section deals explicitly with "civic leagues or
oganizations," that phrase has been construed to include homeowners associations. Since
this comment is not primarily concerned with the issue of tax exemption, it will suffice to
note that a homeowners association may be exempt from taxation even though it does not
necessarily appear to provide a benefit to the community that would customarily be viewed
as "charitable." See, e.g., Rancho Santa Fe Association v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 54
(S.D. Cal. 1954) (holding that a homeowners association "perform[ed] the functions of a
governmental entity and br[ought] about civic betterments and social improvements that
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nonprofit sector. Since migrating to America, this sector has be-
come similar in many ways to the modern business corporation,
including the structure and management of the organizations.9
B. Statutory Authority Governing Nonprofits
In most states, nonprofits are governed by statutes and codes
created specifically for the nonprofit sector and distinct from the
for-profit business corporation codes. 10 Other states have no spe-
cial legislation governing nonprofits, but follow the for-profit law
and apply it by analogy to nonprofits." In either case, the respon-
sibilities of boards of directors (or trustees, as they are often
known in the realm of nonprofits) are similar for both the for-
profit and nonprofit organization. 2 Nonprofits can provide for the
composition, election, and removal of directors in their articles of
incorporation (or equivalent document) or in their bylaws. Thus,
many statutory provisions govern only where those other sources
of authority are silent.
C. Nonprofit Directors are Generally Elected and Removed by
Members or Shareholders
According to the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, di-
rectors may be removed by the members or by any sub-group of
members that elected the director. 3 Directors may be removed by
other directors only when they are elected by those directors, and
even then they may only be removed for cause." The organiza-
tion's articles or bylaws, of course, can provide for different proce-
dures and can otherwise limit the application of the Act.'5 If any
would be sorely missed by the ... community should they be lost or curtailed," and there-
fore was a "tax exempt organization devoted to the general welfare"). But see Indian Lake
Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 813 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Mo. 1991)
(holding that a homeowners association's activities were designed to protect wholly private
interests, and therefore the organization was not exempt from taxation).
9. Cherry, supra note 6, at 559-60.
10. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 151-52
(2004).
11. Id. at 152. Kansas and Delaware are the only states that do not have some kind of
statutory scheme governing nonprofits exclusively. Id.
12. See, e.g., 1 NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: Corps., Trusts, and Assoc. § 3:16; REV. MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01 et seq.





of those procedures are not used, a director can be removed for
cause in a judicial proceeding.16
The treatment of directors of nonprofits differs somewhat from
that of for-profit directors. The Model Business Corporation Act
provides for director removal only by shareholder action or
through judicial proceeding. 7 As with nonprofits, a for-profit cor-
poration could establish its own procedures, but evidently it is
considered more normal to allow the shareholders to determine
the makeup of the board. If the directors are not satisfied with
that procedure because of a director's behavior, judicial interven-
tion is still an option.
Pennsylvania provides for removal of directors in a business
corporation in 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1726, and provides for the re-
moval of directors of a nonprofit in 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5726. The
two provisions are almost identical, both containing the following
provision in subsection (b):
(b) Removal by the board.-Unless otherwise provided in
a bylaw adopted by the shareholders, the board of direc-
tors may declare vacant the office of a director who has
been judicially declared of unsound mind or who has been
convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for a
term of more than one year or for any other proper cause
which the bylaws may specify or if, within 60 days or
such other time as the bylaws may specify after notice of
his selection, he does not accept the office either in writ-
ing or by attending a meeting of the board of directors
and fulfill such other requirements of qualification as the
bylaws may specify.18
This provision departs from the model acts for both kinds of cor-
porations by allowing directors to remove each other under limited
circumstances. As in the model acts, the Pennsylvania statutes
give deference to the corporation's articles and bylaws, but if those
authorities are silent, the board may remove a director for one of
three reasons: (1) a judicial declaration that he or she is of un-
sound mind, (2) a conviction for an offense of a certain gravity, or
(3) "proper cause," with the last reason apparently dependent
upon the bylaws. It is against this backdrop that the common-
16. Id. at § 8.10.
17. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.08, 8.09 (2005).
18. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1726(b), 5726(b) (1995).
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wealth court decided a recent case involving a nonprofit home-
owners association.
III. THE LUTZ DECISION
A. Background
Keith Lutz was first elected to the board of directors ("Board") of
the Tanglwood Lakes Community Association, Inc. by its members
in 1992, and he served as treasurer from 1993 until May 2003.9
In April 2003, the Board undertook a financial audit to "investi-
gate irregularities in record-keeping and in the dispensation of
compensatory time."20 On July 17, 2003, the Board heard a pres-
entation from its legal committee. The committee had concluded
that Lutz had allowed employees to use their compensatory time
to pay association dues, and further concluded that Lutz treated
compensatory time in an "illegal manner."2'
As a result of this presentation, the Board voted to remove Lutz,
as well as other employees.22 Had he not been removed, Lutz's
term as director would have expired on December 31, 2003.23 On
August 15, 2003, Lutz petitioned the Court of Common Pleas to
review the Board's actions. The petition was dismissed as moot in
an order dated January 5, 2004 because, since Lutz's term would
have expired at the end of 2003, he could not be reinstated even if
the Board acted improperly.24 Without any meaningful relief,
there was no longer a controversy.25 The court further granted the
Board's motion for summary judgment in the same order because
it read 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5726(b) to confer authority upon the
Board to remove a director for cause, and the accusations against
Lutz appeared to warrant removal.2"
B. The Majority Opinion
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, in a majority opin-
ion by Judge Leavitt, began its analysis by considering whether
19. Lutz v. Tangiwood Lakes Community Association, Inc., 866 A.2d 471, 472 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005).
20. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 472.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 472-73.
23. Id. at 473.
24. Id.




Lutz's case was moot.27 The court stated the rule that, even
though an actual case or controversy might not exist, a court will
hear a case when "the conduct complained of is capable of repeti-
tion yet likely to evade judicial review, when the case involves is-
sues of great public importance or when one party will suffer a
detriment in the absence of a court decision."
28
The commonwealth court concluded that the issues presented in
Lutz's case were of great importance to the operations of Pennsyl-
vania nonprofits.29 Furthermore, because directors' terms are
generally short, the actions of the Board could easily be repeated
without encountering judicial review.3° As a result, the first two
exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, and the court heard
the merits of Lutz's appeal.
Lutz's case, the court observed, turned on the meaning of the
Pennsylvania statute governing the removal of a nonprofit's direc-
tor by other directors.31 It went on to conclude that, because Lutz
was neither convicted of any crime nor declared to be of unsound
mind, the Board's action was appropriate only if he was removed
"for any other proper cause which the bylaws may specify." ' Each
party to the appeal offered its own interpretation of the meaning
of this clause. Lutz maintained that the Board could only make
use of this clause if Tanglwood's bylaws defined "proper cause."3
Tanglwood countered that the Board could remove a director for
any proper cause that the Board determined at the time of re-
moval, regardless of whether the bylaws were silent on the defini-
tion of "proper cause."34
The court agreed with Tanglwood.35 Its reasoning was based on
the premise that "[w]ords and phrases [in statutes] shall be con-
strued according to rules of grammar and according to their com-
mon and approved usage."36 The court further relied on Strunk
and White's "Elements" 37 to parse the phrase "any other proper
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Horsehead Resource Development Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, 780 A.2d 856 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)).
29. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 473-74.
30. Id. at 474.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5726(b)).
33. Id. at 475.
34. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 474-75.
35. Id. at 475.
36. Id. at 474 (quoting 1 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1903(a)).
37. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR., & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (4th ed. 2000).
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cause which the bylaws may specify."" According to Strunk and
White, the word "which" is a "nondefining, nonrestrictive pro-
noun."9 Therefore, the phrase "which the bylaws may specify"
does not define "proper cause," but rather modifies the term to
permit the organization to define it in the bylaws.4 ° The majority
found further support for this interpretation by the use of the
word "may" in the statute.41 The court could have elaborated more
on that point, but apparently the permissive character of that
word negated any possibility that the statute required a definition
in the bylaws.
As a result of the majority's interpretation, the Board was au-
thorized to remove a director "for proper cause, irrespective of
whether the bylaws specify what constitutes 'proper cause'" and
the Board acted within its authority. 2 It therefore affirmed the
trial court's order insofar as it granted Tanglwood's motion for
summary judgment. 3
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Smith-Ribner authored a dissenting opinion, in which he
argued in favor of adopting Lutz's interpretation of Section
5726(b)." He began by highlighting that the dispute largely
turned on the statute's use of the word "which" rather than
"that."5 Indeed, if the statute had said "any other proper cause
that the bylaws may specify," most people would agree that, de-
spite the presence of the word "may," the only proper causes that
would permit the Board to remove a director would be those set
forth in the bylaws.
Instead of ending his inquiry at the Strunk & White manual,
Judge Smith-Ribner cited Fowler's grammar guide for elucidation
of the which-versus-that controversy. 46 According to the Fowler
guide, ideal English usage would dictate that "which" would be the
38. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 475.




43. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 475-76.
44. Id. at 476-79 (Smith-Ribner, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 476-77.




nondefining pronoun, and "that" the defining pronoun.47 However,
the Fowler guide includes the conclusion that "it would be idle to
pretend that [this distinction] is the practice either of most or of
the best writers." 8 It is this simple observation of real-world prac-
tice that gives common-sense appeal to Judge Smith-Ribner's dis-
sent.
The dissent went on to opine that the word choice should not de-
cide the meaning of the phrase in the statute - the punctuation
should.49 Judge Smith-Ribner rejected the majority's reading of
the clause as nonrestrictive for the simple fact that the clause was
not introduced by a comma.50 If there had been a comma, e.g. "for
any other proper cause, which the bylaws may specify," then he
presumably would agree with the majority that the statute merely
gave the organization the option of defining "proper cause" in its
bylaws.5' However, the absence of a comma communicates to the
reader that the clause defines the noun preceding it: "any pur-
pose" is limited to those purposes set forth in the bylaws. 2 For
this point, Judge Smith-Ribner relied on Strunk & White, while
observing that Fowler offers the same explanation.3
Judge Smith-Ribner further rejected the majority's reliance on
the word "may," because that word could denote the possibility of
the bylaws defining "proper cause," rather than denoting permis-
sion to do so.' 4 He then pointed out that the context of the non-
profit corporation statute already provided that an organization
was allowed to set forth provisions for the removal of a director if
it wanted, leaving no reason for this subsection to grant that per-
mission." Finally, the dissent argued that the context also made
it clear that the members of a nonprofit have the primary author-
ity to remove a director. 6 Therefore, the court should hesitate to
47. Id. (citing FOWLER at 774). Fowler appears to draw the same distinction with "de-
fining" and "nondefining" that Strunk & White draw with "restrictive" and "nonrestrictive."
48. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 477 (Smith-Ribner, J., dissenting) (citing FOWLER at 774).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 477.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 477 (Smith-Ribner, J., dissenting) (citing STRUNK & WHITE at 59;
FOWLER at 672).
54. Id. at 477-78 (citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 718-19 (10th ed. 1997);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1000 (8th ed. 2004)).




interpret the statute in such a way as to shift that power to the
Board.57
For those reasons, Judge Smith-Ribner stated that he would
hold that the Board did not have the authority to remove Lutz for
any cause unless it was provided for in Tanglwood's bylaws.58
Since there were no such provisions in the bylaws, Tanglwood's
motion for summary judgment should have been denied.59
IV. WHY IT IS DANGEROUS TO RELY ON
ONLY ONE GRAMMAR HANDBOOK
It is not every appellate court opinion that relies heavily on eso-
teric distinctions between restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses.
Furthermore, only rarely do Strunk, White, and Fowler find their
way into court opinions."0 In Pennsylvania specifically, this author
was only able to find one other court opinion citing the Fowler
guide.6
The court in Lutz demonstrated why it is best to avoid relying
on these sources: the majority allowed the hypertechnical to defeat
the context in which the statute was operating. In the world of
corporations, either for-profit or nonprofit, there are very few in-
stances where a board of directors or trustees is allowed to usurp
the role of its shareholders (or members, in a nonprofit setting)
and remove one of its own. Now, in Pennsylvania, any corporation
that does not provide otherwise in its bylaws is allowed, through
its board, to remove a director for any reason, as long as it appears
afterward to be "proper."
A. A Realistic Treatment of Grammar
Judge Smith-Ribner's dissent presents a common-sense, realis-
tic understanding of how "which" and "that" operate in modern
use of the English language. Indeed, many readers of this law
review might be surprised to learn that they were supposed to be
57. Id.
58. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 478-79 (Smith-Ribner, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. A Westlaw search of all federal cases citing STRUNK & WHITE shows forty-nine
citations to the book as authority for interpreting a statute or other writing, where the
interpretation might affect the outcome of a case. There are thirty-one such citations to
FOWLER in the federal courts.
61. See Girard Trust Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 364 A.2d 495, 500 (Pa.




using these two words with such precision. As Fowler's guide
stated in the entry relied on by the dissent, through the evolution
that the English language allows, "that" and "which" have become
interchangeable in many instances.
The majority's first error was in ending its inquiry with White &
Strunk's The Elements of Style. Many critics (this author in-
cluded) consider that guide to be not only prescriptive, but pre-
scriptive to an earlier era of English usage.62 The Fowler guide, on
the other hand, is regarded as a reflection of the actual usage of
the language. 3 Judge Smith-Ribner's elucidation of the dispute
illustrates the validity of those perspectives.
Additionally, the majority could have taken guidance from the
United States Supreme Court. The High Court has provided at
least one lesson in delving too deeply into grammarians' opinions
when interpreting the law:
many leading grammarians, while sometimes noting that
commas at the end of series can avoid ambiguity, concede
that use of such commas is discretionary. See, e.g., B.
EVANS & C. EvANs, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN USAGE 103 (1957); M. NICHOLSON, A
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN-ENGLISH USAGE 94 (1957); R.
COPPERUD, A DICTIONARY OF USAGE AND STYLE 94-95
(1964); cf. W. STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF
STYLE 1-2 (1959). When grammarians are divided,
and surely where they are cheerfully tolerant, we
will not attach significance to an omitted comma. It is
enough to say that the statute's punctuation is fully con-
sistent with the respondent's interpretation, and that in
62. See, e.g., Richard H. Minear, E. B. White takes his leave, or does he? The Elements of
Style, six editions (1918-2000), 45 Massachusetts Review 51-71 (Spring 2004) (describing a
history of the collaboration between White and Strunk, as well as praise and criticism for
the book in its many editions).
63. See, e.g., L. C. Mugglestone, The New Fowler's Modern English Usage, 44 Notes and
Queries 437 (Dec. 1997) (examining how subsequent editions of FOWLER have traced a
history of the language through the twentieth century: "Arbitrary assumptions about 'cor-
rectness' are regularly rejected in favour of more complex, and pluralist, accounts of con-
sensus norms as MEU3 [the third edition of FOWLER] comes to manifest decidedly descrip-
tive traits."). Furthermore, Jane Rodes, my first-year legal research and writing instructor,
specifically recommended FOWLER as an aide to students in their assignments, and a more
reliable source of recommendation you will not find.
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this case grammatical expertise will not help to clarify
the statute's meaning.6
Had the commonwealth court looked to this opinion for guid-
ance, it might have gone beyond Strunk & White to see that
grammarians are indeed divided on the use of "which," and at
least one grammarian is "cheerfully" tolerant of its use in place of
"that." The court then could have gone on to give the statute an
interpretation that comported better with ordinary usage, and
perhaps also the overriding goals of the statutory scheme in ques-
tion.
That interpretation might have run like this: the board of direc-
tors of a nonprofit may remove a director when one of three condi-
tions is met: (1) a director may be removed if a court declares him
or her to be of unsound mind, (2) if he or she is convicted of a
crime, the conviction of which carries a possible sentence of one
year or more, or (3) if the board of directors has proper cause to
remove a director, provided that the organization's bylaws define
"proper cause." Under the third option, the organization is free to
adopt whatever definition of "proper cause" it desires.65
B. Conflicting Public Policies
Before finishing its discussion of the role of grammar in the
relevant statute, the majority in Lutz declared that "sound public
policy" favored its interpretation over that of Judge Smith-
Ribner's dissent." The majority, however, did not articulate what
that policy was. Instead, it stated in a conclusory manner that
"the legislature's default provision is that a Board may remove a
director for cause." 7
There is no explanation of why public policy would favor such a
default provision. The history and current state of corporate law
64. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 340 n.6 (1971) (emphasis added).
65. The majority opinion also relied, in a footnote, on the fact that 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §
5726(b) is introduced with the phrase "unless otherwise provided in a bylaw adopted by the
members." Lutz, 866 A.2d at 475 n.9. The majority reasoned that the phrase "which the
bylaws may specify" could not be reasonably read to limit the board's authority when the
opening phrase allows the organization to alter any affect of the statute through its bylaws.
Id. This explanation is unsatisfying - the opening permissive language allows the organi-
zation's bylaws to waive the affect of all of subsection (b), whereas the later phrase creates
a limit on the default powers of the board by requiring some specificity in the bylaws before
the board may remove a director for cause without submitting the issue to the organiza-
tion's members.
66. Lutz, 866 A.2d at 475 n.9.
67. Id.
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indicates that shareholders have that kind of authority, and the
members of a nonprofit are most closely analogous to sharehold-
ers. Instead of being "sound public policy," the majority's inter-
pretation allows a nonprofit board to remove one of its own direc-
tors between elections without allowing the primary source of con-
trol, i.e. the members, to take part in the decision.
The dissenting opinion does not use the term "public policy," but
does indicate what was likely the true public policy behind the
statute. Judge Smith-Ribner correctly observed that "the Non-
profit Corporation Law of 1988 [assigns] the primary responsibil-
ity for the selection and removal of directors to the corporation's
membership."" Therefore, the court's decision leaves boards free
to decide on their own what proper cause for removal will be. 9
That, in turn, creates the risk that a director will be removed for a
cause that the average person, and actual shareholders or mem-
bers, may not deem "proper," merely because the rest of the board
would like to remove him or her.7" A director in such a position
might well be able to petition a court for reinstatement, but by
then he would be relying on a judge to find some pretext on the
part of the board, which a judge would very likely be anxious to
avoid.
C. Broader Effects of the Lutz Decision
Recall that for-profit corporations are governed by the same
statutory language as nonprofits, at least with regard to removal
of a director by the rest of the board. Because the language at is-
sue in Lutz governs both for-profit and nonprofit corporations, the
case's holding could easily be applied to disputes arising out of a
for-profit board's removal of a director.
The majority in Lutz found (or created) a public policy in favor
of allowing nonprofit directors to be removed from their positions
by the very directors with whom they served. This policy arose
out of the statutory language embodied in 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5726 (b). The for-profit version of this language is found at 15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 1726 (b). If the language giving rise to the policy is
the same, then the commonwealth court implicitly stated that for-
profit corporations are governed by the same policy. Furthermore,





the grammatical reading of the statute would have to be the same,
since the word choice and punctuation is identical.7'
As a result, Pennsylvania now allows directors of a for-profit
corporation to be removed by fellow directors for any cause the
majority deems proper, as long as the bylaws do not restrict that
authority. Experienced corporate attorneys have probably already
avoided this result with the corporations they represent - bylaws
for large corporations probably leave little to the uncertainties of
developing law. However, small businesses still often choose a
corporate form, and it is by no means certain that their bylaws
contain the language necessary to avoid the effects of the statutes
governing director removal.
D. Hope Springs Eternal
When a court interprets a statute poorly, there are essentially
two ways to undo that action: amending the statute and reversing
the order of the court in question (assuming it is not the court of
last resort). In this case, it is unlikely that the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly will make it a priority to amend this statute.72 But,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Lutz's Petition for Al-
lowance of Appeal on July 19, 2005. 73 In that appeal, the Court
will have the opportunity to take a fresh look at the extent to
which 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5726 limits the authority of a board of
directors to remove one of its directors.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertakes its review,
it will have the benefit of two strong opinions from the common-
wealth court, and perhaps it will have extensive briefing by the
parties concerning statutory interpretation. With those resources
and the court's own ability to investigate both English usage and
the relevant public policies, perhaps it can reach a reasonable con-
clusion and foreclose the possibility that boards of directors, of for-
71. This comment intentionally ignores the disturbing possibility that another court
could conclude that the same syntax and punctuation could give rise to a conflicting inter-
pretation merely because a statute applies to a different kind of entity. Should a court
pursue this route, it might arrive at the correct outcome for the dispute before it, but it
would do nothing to aid Pennsylvania corporate jurisprudence.
72. At the time of this writing, the Pennsylvania state legislature is faced with low
levels of approval as a result of controversial pay raise legislation, the repeal of which was
the subject of further controversy, as well as controversial gambling and lobbying legisla-
tion. With such issues in the public eye, legislators are unlikely to effectuate a change in
the treatment of corporate directors.
73. Lutz v. Tangiwood Lakes Community Association, Inc., 880 A.2d 502 (Pa. 2005).
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profits and nonprofits alike, will be able to usurp the authority of
shareholders and members to take control of an organization.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of for-profit and nonprofit corporations, the statutes
governing corporations in Pennsylvania, and the policies underly-
ing those statutes all support the conclusion that boards of direc-
tors should not have the authority to determine their own compo-
sition unless their organization's bylaws specifically allow for that
authority. The decision of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Lutz v. Tanglwood Lakes Community Association, Inc.
reached a different conclusion, possibly because the court's major-
ity simply thought that the Board made the right decision in re-
moving Lutz. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the outcome of the
case as it pertains to the parties, the court's holding might create
problems of corporate governance that could affect not only non-
profits (which would be unfortunate enough) but business corpora-
tions as well.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will soon hear Lutz's ap-
peal. When it does, it should take the opportunity to fix the com-
monwealth court's mistake and allow Pennsylvania law to treat
directors of corporations and nonprofit organizations appropri-
ately.
Jeffrey V. Mansell
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